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I. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has added three factors to its collection 
of analytical touchstones in the realm of regulatory takings with its decision 
in the case of Murr v. Wisconsin.
1
 As an extension of the Supreme Court’s 
controversial jurisprudence on regulatory takings, this case has certainly 
been subjected to its fair share of criticism. Aside from the fundamental 
criticisms of Murr, the Supreme Court’s rationale poses interesting, 
challenging, and uncertain consequences for Oklahoma landowners and 
regulators. Before discussing the consequences of Murr, it is important to 
keep some background in mind. 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution harbors many of 
the rights Americans enjoy. Among the many rights contained in the Fifth 
Amendment resides in what is known as the Takings Clause.
2
 That clause 
states as follows: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation.”
3
 Upon first glance, the language of the Takings Clause 
indicates a negative right of the People to be protected from the government 
taking their property without being justly compensated. But, underlying this 
protection from the government is a power that the government itself 
wields. Namely, state and federal governments have the power to take 
private property so long as a citizen is justly compensated. This power is 
known as eminent domain—an old, deep-rooted, and fundamental 
government power. In fact, the Takings Clause’s limitation on eminent 
domain is so fundamental in American jurisprudence that it was the first 
part of the Bill of Rights applied to the states.
4
 
As a general proposition, the Takings Clause involves four inquiries.
5
 
First, a court must determine whether a taking has even occurred.
6
 Second, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. Id. 
 4. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 667 
(Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2015) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226 (1897)). 
 5. Id. at 668. 
 6. Id. 
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a court must determine whether the taking involves “property” as 
contemplated by the Fifth Amendment.
7
 Third, if the first and second 
questions have been answered in the affirmative, a court must determine 
whether the taking was for “public use.”
8
 The final question is whether 
“just compensation” has been paid.
9
 Beyond these four questions, Takings 
Clause cases consists of two principal categories: (1) “possessory” takings 
and (2) “regulatory” takings.
10
 A “possessory” taking is “when the 
government confiscates or physically occupies property,” and a 
“regulatory” taking can be defined as one that “occurs when the 




The government’s eminent domain power is easily understood in the 
context of a possessory or physical taking. In fact, it was originally thought 
that “in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable ‘taking’ could 
occur only through physical encroachment and occupation.”
12
 The Supreme 
Court has broadly interpreted what constitutes a “possessory” taking. Some 
common examples of this include government confiscation or occupation of 




American courts have also recognized that government action other than 
a confiscation or physical occupation can constitute a taking that implicates 
the Fifth Amendment. These types of government actions are the second 
category of takings known as “regulatory takings.” The basic premise of a 
regulatory taking is this: When a government implements a regulation, the 
value of someone’s property can be adversely impacted, and the property 
owner should be justly compensated for the loss in value. It is recognized 
that, at some level, “any government regulation decreases the value of 
someone’s property.”
14
 Therefore, the relevant inquiry is not whether a 
government regulation does in fact negatively impact someone’s property, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 669. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (citing Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1184 (1967)). 
 13. Id. at 669-70 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
427 (1982); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)). 
 14. Id. at 668. 
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it is instead a question of at which point a government regulation impacts 
the value of someone’s property in a way that would require the 
government to justly compensate the property owner.
15
 
II. Law Before the Case 
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Regulatory Takings 
To say the least, the Supreme Court’s cases on regulatory takings have 
left anything but a bright-line rule to guide lower courts in their analysis.
16
 
Instead, the Court has handed down a sampling of cases that serve as 
analytical touchstones, each of which leaves lower courts with a few things 
to consider. Ultimately, this leaves the courts to engage in what could 
appear as an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis.
17
 
The first landmark case that the Supreme Court decided that strayed from 
the traditional physical taking framework of the Takings Clause comes by 
way of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.
18
 In Mahon, a homeowner sued the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company, claiming that their mining operations would 
“cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house” in violation of 
Pennsylvania law,
19
 which specifically prohibited coal mining operations 
that would cause subsidence.
20
 The Court ultimately recognized that in this 
circumstance, the coal company’s ability to mine had been rendered 
impracticable to the extent that the statute substantively functions in a way 
that had “nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating 
or destroying it.”
21
 Ultimately, the lesson learned from this case is that even 
though the government, through the Pennsylvania law, did not physically 
occupy or confiscate the mining company’s property, the statute could still 
implicate the Takings Clause.
22
 Unfortunately, Mahon did not provide 
much guidance to lower courts in terms of what exactly would qualify as a 
“taking” when government action is only the implementation or 
enforcement of a statute. In fact, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See id. at 668, 675. 
 16. Id. at 669. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) [hereinafter Mahon]. 
 19. Id. at 412. 
 20. Id. at 412-13. 
 21. Id. at 414. 
 22. Id. at 415. 
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went so far in saying that this question is one “of degree-and therefore 
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”
23
 
More guidance on the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s protections 
against regulatory takings without just compensation comes several decades 
later in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
24
 In Penn 
Central, the City of New York enacted a law allowing the City’s 
Landmarks Preservation Commission (“Commission”) to designate 
property as a “landmark” or other designation that would in turn prohibit 
some types of development.
25
 At issue was the Commission’s designation 
of Grand Central Terminal (“Terminal”) as a “landmark.”
26
 Consequently, 
when the owners of the Terminal applied to build an office building on top 
of the station, they were denied.
27
 Despite this denial, the Court held that 
the designation did not constitute a taking as understood by the Fifth 
Amendment,
28
 and, therefore, the owners were not entitled to 
compensation. 
More important than the outcome, however, is the framework by which 
the Court analyzed the question of whether a taking had occurred. In that 
regard, the Court identified three primary factors which play into the 
decision of whether a government regulation, such as the one here, 
constitutes a “taking.”
29
 First, the Court noted that the “economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant” should be considered.
30
 Second, courts 
generally should consider “the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”
31
 Third, courts should 
consider the “character of the governmental action.”
32
 In addition to these 
three factors, it is crucial to note that the Court goes out of its way to 
identify the inherently ad hoc, fact-specific nature of analyzing 
governmental actions in terms of whether something is a “taking” for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. Undoubtedly, this three-factor analysis is anything 
but a bright-line rule that lower courts can formulaically apply. Despite the 
lack of a bright-line rule, some commentators have noted that Penn Central 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 416. 
 24. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) [hereinafter Penn Central]. 
 25. Id. at 109-12. 
 26. Id. at 115. 
 27. Id. at 116-17. 
 28. Id. at 135-38. 
 29. Id. at 124. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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and its progeny have not left lower courts in the dark. For example, it has 
been said that these cases have “at the very least[, established that] there is 
not a regulatory taking when the government’s action leaves reasonable 
economically viable use of the property.”
33
 
B. Criticisms of Penn Central, its Progeny, and the Supreme Court’s 
Approach to Regulatory Takings 
Unsurprisingly, one of the main criticisms of Penn Central is that it still 
does not give lower courts much guidance. More poignantly, however, the 
Penn Central decision and the Court’s approach to interpreting regulatory 
takings has been criticized as an area of law and methodology of analysis 
that is beyond the Supreme Court’s constitutional powers.
34
 In his article, 
Schwartz identifies three primary methods of Constitutional 
interpretation—all of which he claims do not support the Court’s regulatory 
takings interpretation. Those methods are (1) textualism, (2) originalism, 
and (3) evolutionary document theory.
35
 
First, textualism, also referred to as strict constructionism, is defined as 
“a literal, plain meaning of the terms of the Constitution.”
36
 It has been 
argued that the text of the Fifth Amendment referring to, among other 
things, “private property”
37
 limits takings analysis to things like 
appropriation of title or physical appropriation of property through the 
government’s exercise of eminent domain.
38
 Under this argument, the 
impact of a regulation on property is plainly beyond the Fifth Amendment’s 
scope. 
Second, originalism is defined as going beyond textualism insofar as it is 
“attempting to discern the intent of the framers or the public[’s] 
understanding of constitutional text at the time it was ratified.”
39
 Generally, 
it has been argued that the original understanding of the Takings Clause had 
nothing to do with government regulation, and that it had everything to do 
with the government physically occupying or taking control of an 
individual’s property.
40
 Schwartz goes as far as to say that Justice Scalia, an 
                                                                                                                 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 676. 
 34. E.g., Andre W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation 
Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (2015). 
 35. Id. at 255. 
 36. Id. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 38. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 255-56. 
 39. Id. at 257.  
 40. Id. at 258 (citations omitted). 
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adamant defender of regulatory takings has all but admitted that the framers 
did not contemplate regulatory takings.
41
 Specifically, Schwartz noted that 
Justice Scalia admitted as much in Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council,
42
 where he 
said that before Mahon, “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause 
reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property” and that “[e]arly 
constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced 
regulations of property at all.”
43
 
Third, the evolutionary document theory is described as “propos[ing] 
that the Constitution establishes a general framework for effective 
governance of a nation destined to grow and change,” but this growth and 
change is limited by the “core values embodied in the various provisions of 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence [which] tend to 
further both individual dignity and collective democratic activity.”
44
 There 
are three primary reasons for arguing that evolutionary document theory 
does not support the Court’s approach to regulatory takings: (1) it is not 
supported by precedent, (2) it is contrary to the core values of the 
Constitution, and (3) the Court’s concern for overbearing regulation is 
overstated.
45
Despite academic criticism of the Court’s approach to 




III. Statement of the Case 
Murr v. Wisconsin is the Supreme Court’s most recent decision 
interpreting and implementing its regulatory takings jurisprudence.
47
 
A. Facts of the Case 
This case involves two adjoining lots owned by the Murr family, one of 
which has a cabin built on it, and all of which rests along the St. Croix 
River in Wisconsin.
48
 After the transfer of the parcels of land to the Murr 
children, Lot F being transferred in 1994 and Lot E in 1995, they sought to 
move the cabin on Lot F “to a different portion of the lot and [to] sell[] Lot 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 257-58. 
 42. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 43. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 258 n.34 (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 259-60 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 255-312. 
 46. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1940. 
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E to fund the project.”
49
 However, Wisconsin law prohibited them from 
doing so because the lots unified under common ownership principles.
50
 A 
statute unifying lots is also known as a merger provision. The Murrs 
claimed that this prohibition constituted a regulatory taking, noting that the 
appraised value of the lots together was approximately $70,000 less than if 
they were allowed to sell the “lots as two distinct buildable 
properties. . . .”
51
 The Circuit Court of St. Croix County granted summary 
judgment in favor of the state of Wisconsin because, among other reasons, 
the Murrs “had not been deprived of all economic value of their property.”
52
 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and the Wisconsin 




Turning to whether a regulatory taking had occurred here, the Court 
posed a more narrow and important question: “What is the proper unit of 





The Supreme Court held that the State of Wisconsin’s action did not 
constitute a regulatory taking.
55
 
D. Decision of the Case 
Because the facts in Murr technically involve more than one parcel of 
land, the Court had identified the relevant parcel or parcels of land involved 
before applying the three regulatory taking factors from Penn Central. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy identified an additional three 
factors for the Court to consider when determining the relevant parcel: 
First, courts should give substantial weight to the treatment of 
the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state 
and local law. . . . Second, courts must look to the physical 
characteristics of the landowner’s property. . . . Third, courts 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 1941. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1941-42. 
 54. Id. at 1943. 
 55. Id. at 1949. 
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The Court ultimately determined that, taken together, these three factors 




E. Potential Implications of the Decision 
On top of being a significant decision in terms of an affirming the 
“parcel as a whole” concept, Murr could have implications for Oklahoma’s 
regulatory entities. Namely, this decision could significantly impact on the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s (“OCC”) efforts to regulate injection 
wells in response to the increased level of earthquakes in Oklahoma. 
IV. Criticisms and Commentary on the Case 
One criticism of Murr is that it continues the Court’s regulatory takings 
approach and failed to provide any clarity to what some perceive as a 
particularly messy area of law.
58
 For example, it has been argued that the 
Court has failed to resolve an inherent tension between a state’s ability to 
“define the contours of property rights” and the federal courts’ interest in 
identifying and resolving regulatory taking issues.
59
 In other words, 
although the Court gives much deference to states to define and shape the 
nature of property rights, the Court cannot give the states a “carte blanche 
to regulate away all the value of private property[, and doing otherwise] 
would render the protection provide by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking 
Clause a dead letter.”
60
 This tension was reflected in Murr because of the 
State’s merger provision which functionally resulted in a substantial 
devaluation of the siblings’ interest, but the Court did not find that a 
regulatory taking occurred because of the merger provision.
61
 Instead of 
solely deferring to state property law or holding “that property rights are not 
so malleable that the state can erase them simply because title changes 
hands,” like in the case of the Murrs, it is argued that the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 1945-46. 
 57. Id. at 1948-50. 
 58. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, Cato 
Sup. Ct. Rev., 2016-2017 (2017) [hereinafter Garnett]. 
 59. Id. at 132. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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 The Court turned regulatory taking law 
from a “muddle” to a “mudslide” because it “articulate[d] a multifactor 
balancing test that seeks, for the first time, to define ‘property’ as a matter 
of federal constitutional law.”
63
 
It is argued that this “mudslide” is problematic for a couple of reasons. 
First, when read in conjunction with the Court’s holding in Lucas,
64
 which 
indicates that a plaintiff will be more successful if they can prove a “total 
taking,” Murr now incentivizes landowners to “define the relevant ‘private 
property’ narrowly [which] threatens the careful balance between property 
rights and government authority that our regulatory takings doctrine 
strikes . . . .”
65
 Now, courts generally have a default position in not finding 
a taking where a plaintiff’s property has not been completely taken. Surely, 
though, finding no taking should not be the outcome in a takings case when 
a person’s property has been substantially devalued by a government 
regulation. The second reason it is argued that this “mudslide” is 
problematic is the fact that the Court had never before addressed the 
question of what the relevant parcel is in the context of a regulatory takings 
action where the State changed the parcel’s boundaries through a merger 
provision.
66
 This is problematic because it departs from an existing 
guidepost in the regulatory takings muddle—underlying state law.
67
 Federal 
courts fundamentally defer to state law on issues concerning the contours 
and definitions of property interests.
68
 That question, however, is now a 
subjective and potentially cumbersome analytical hurdle federal courts will 
now have to address which “decidedly tips the scales in favor of the 
government, further undermining the Takings Clause’s already limited 
protection against regulatory excess.”
69
 
Similar to the “mudslide” issue, Murr’s critics also argue that the Court’s 
decision endangers the concept of “property federalism.”
70
 This criticism 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 133. 
 63. Id. For further discussion on the confusion Murr v. Wisconsin creates for the 
Supreme Court’s approach to regulatory takings cases, see generally Lynn E. Blais, The 
Total Takings Myth, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 47 (2017). 
 64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 65. Garnett, supra note 58, at 138 (citing Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 139. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. 
Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 53, 55-56 (2017). 
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rests on the concept that “the Constitution protects different interests in 
different jurisdictions, depending on the content of state-specific law.”
71
 For 
example, despite the traditional divide between the scope of federal and 
state protections, Brady argues that the first factor of Murr, which “invites 
courts to examine the treatment of property under ‘reasonable’ state and 
local law” does nothing more than inject other states’ concepts of property 
law into a different state.
72
 
Furthermore, another criticism of Murr, like those described by Garnett, 
is that Murr unnecessarily complicates regulatory takings law. At the core 
of that argument is this: Murr failed to return takings law to first 
principles.
73
 The alleged departure from first principles stems from the 
Court’s interpretations of the takings clause in cases like Mahon and Penn 
Central because those cases completely lack “any textual foundation in the 
takings clause.”
74
 According to Epstein, these cases are not sufficiently 
grounded in the text because they go too far beyond physical takings, which 
he argues is problematic because it “systematically encourage[s] the 
government to impose regulations with public benefits that are less than 
private costs imposed on the landowner.”
75
 
To correct the problem that the Court created with its regulatory takings 
approach, Epstein proposes a new, comprehensive test for the Court to 
adopt for its Takings Clause cases.
76
 That test comprises of four questions 
to be addressed in chronological order:  
First, has there been a taking of private property? Second, if so, 
is it justified under the police power so that no compensation 
need be paid? Third, if not, has the taking been for a public use? 




In support of this four-question approach, Epstein alludes to Justice 
Roberts’ dissent in Murr where the Chief Justice claimed that the recurring 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 66. 
 73. Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to 
Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 151, 183-84 (2017). 
 74. Id. at 193. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 194. 
 77. Id. 
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Epstein goes further in his argument favoring a physical property 
focused Takings Clause by noting the difference in analysis between 
physical and regulatory takings in the compensation portion of the analysis. 
Unlike the regulatory taking context, Epstein notes that the compensation 
calculation for physical takings “does not include ‘any supposed benefit 
that the owner may receive common with all from the public uses to which 
his private property is appropriated.”
79
 Valuing such benefits would pose a 
heavy burden on the condemnation system and it is unnecessary in the 
physical taking context because the person from whom the government is 
taking may also enjoy the public benefit of that taking.
80
 On the other hand, 
the valuation analysis for the compensation portion of the Takings Clause 
becomes a more difficult question because “compensation is not needed 
when [the regulations] in question [secure] ‘an average reciprocity of 
advantage’ among all the relevant players.”
81
 Because this ‘balancing’ of 
costs and benefits to those being regulated, cash compensation would be 
less likely and, therefore, the government would be more inclined to engage 
in regulatory takings—the avoidance of which Epstein urges.
82
 
V. Defense of the Court’s Regulatory Takings Approach 
A substantial portion of the literature responding to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Murr and previous regulatory takings cases is negative. 
However, completely abandoning the principles underlying the Court’s 
current regulatory takings approach for a physical-taking approach would 
be inconsistent with the Court’s jurisprudence. Simply put, the basic 
premise that the Takings Clause applies to situations where governmental 
regulation negatively impacts the value of property should remain. In fact, 
Murr presents a great example of why this premise should remain true. 
Opponents to the Court’s regulatory takings approach claim that the 
purpose of the Takings Clause is to protect against physical takings only. 
However, there is a problem with arguments like these and like those 
proffered by Epstein: Although the regulation in Murr is indeed just that, a 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. (citing Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our decisions have, 
time and again, declared that the Takings Clause Protects private property rights as state law 
creates and defines them.”)). 
 79. Id. (citing Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)). 
 80. Id. at 198-99. 
 81. Id. at 199 (citing Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
 82. Id. 
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regulation, limiting the Takings Clause ignores tangible consequences 
suffered by landowners that are tantamount to a physical taking.  
Here, Justice Kennedy found that no compensable regulatory taking 
occurred, but a different outcome in a different case is just as plausible 
under the Court’s framework for identifying the relevant parcel. Indeed, 
Uncle Sam did not overtly commandeer the Murr’s property, but his 
intrusion was no less intimate. Just as if Wisconsin had annexed one of the 
lots the Murr’s owned, the merger provision prohibited them from moving 
the cabin in the way in which they wanted.
83
 Wisconsin has functionally 
removed one of the sticks in the Murr’s bundle of rights as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. For that, and for the accompanying decrease in 
property value, they should be compensated if a court determined that the 
impact on their property value was greater than it was here. Such an 
outcome is nothing more than a reflection of the progression of property 
law in this country—we have moved towards recognizing increasingly 
abstract notions of what property is. Therefore, because the Court’s 
framework provides for the possibility of a regulatory taking being found in 
a different case, the decision should stand. Even though the Supreme Court 
correctly adheres to its earlier regulatory takings approach, Murr presents 
some interesting challenges for Oklahoma energy regulation entities and 
property owners. 
VI. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) 
A. OCC General Authority 
Broadly speaking, the OCC has exclusive jurisdiction over promulgating 
and enforcing regulation over Oklahoma’s oil and gas industry.
84
 
Specifically, the OCC enjoys the following jurisdiction, powers, and 
authority:  
The Corporation Commission is vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction, power and authority, and it shall be its duty, to make 
and enforce such rules and orders governing and regulating the 
handling, storage and disposition of saltwater, mineral brines, 
waste oil and other deleterious substances produced from or 
obtained or used in connection with the drilling, development, 
producing and operating of oil and gas wells and brine wells 
within the state as are reasonable and necessary for the purpose 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941. 
 84. See generally Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 139 (West 2017). 
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of preventing the pollution of the surface and subsurface waters 
in the state, and to otherwise carry out the purpose of this act.
85
 
It is also worth noting that the Commission’s authority under § 139 
specifically includes governance over injection wells.
86
 Under a plain 
reading of this statutory authority, the OCC should be considered the “state 
actor” regarding its rules and directives, especially those pertaining to 
injection wells and earthquakes.
87
 
B. OCC and the Courts 
In addition to the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority delegated 
to the OCC, federal courts have deferred to it in litigation matters, including 
those arising out of disposal well operations.
88
 One recent example of a 
federal court deferring to the commission comes by way of a case where an 
interest group sued disposal well operators for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, claiming that the increased number of earthquakes occurring in 
Oklahoma was caused by the operators.
89
 Because of the OCC’s expertise 
and specialization on such matters—and not the district court’s expertise—
the court dismissed the action.
90
 
The OCC’s authority to step in as a quasi-judicial entity is, however, 
limited in one important respect—its ability to preside over tort litigation. 
During an earthquake in 2011, a claimant said that she was injured when 
some debris fell from the fireplace in her living room.
91
 The claimant filed a 
tort action for damages against injection well operators in the Lincoln 
County Oklahoma District Court; she claimed that because of the operators’ 
actions, an earthquake caused her injuries.
92
 The operators claimed the suit 
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should be dismissed because the OCC had exclusive jurisdiction over cases 
“concerning oil and gas operations.”
93
  
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the OCC’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over “the exploration, drilling, development, 
production and operation of wells used in connection with the recovery, 
injection or disposal of mineral brines.”
94
 Despite this statutory 
authorization of exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court duly noted that the OCC’s jurisdiction does not include 
“authority to hear and determine disputes between two or more private 
persons or entities in which the public interest is not involved.”
95
  
Therefore, while Oklahoma district courts may not impede “upon the 
orders, rules and regulations”
96
 of the OCC, state district courts are 
inherently the appropriate venues in which to bring tort cases such as the 
one brought in Lincoln County.
97
 Further still, it is beyond the OCC’s 
jurisdiction to hear such tort cases.
98
 In other words, while regulation of the 
oil and gas industry is the OCC’s “turf,” litigating and providing remedies 
for common law rights are the province of state district courts.
99
 
C. OCC Oil and Gas Regulations 
Acting under its broad authority, the OCC has issued a directive aimed 
specifically at the relationship between injection wells and increased 
earthquake activity in the state. Specifically, the Commission identified an 
“Earthquake Area of Interest” and intended to limit “the growth in future 
disposal rates” in this area.
100
 Following such directives, the OCC claims 
that the number of earthquakes has decreased.
101
 The OCC’s efforts to 
reduce earthquake activity has gone beyond focusing on disposal to 
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activities like well completion operations;
102
 it now claims that mitigation 
efforts regarding well completion operations have also had an impact on 
earthquake activity. In support of the OCC’s migratory efforts, Dr. Jeremy 
Boak, Director of the Oklahoma Geological Survey claimed that where 
these mitigation efforts have taken place, “earthquake activity either 




VII. Injection Well Regulation Under Murr’s “Parcel-as-a-whole” 
Framework and the Courts’ General Approach to Regulatory Takings. 
A. Background 
Continuing its trend of addressing the earthquake problem, the OCC has, 
for example, expanded its injection well volume reductions as of August 
2017 to three wells in the Edmond area by ninety-five percent of their 
current injection.
104
 It is unclear, and probably unlikely, that the Murr court 
contemplated the unique factual circumstances presented by injection well 
regulations. However, it appears that the “parcel as a whole” analysis would 
apply should a regulatory taking issue emerge. Having said that, one unique 
issue arises when considering well disposal regulation by the OCC because 
of the way it appears that the regulation measures who and what it will 
affect. For example, it appears that the Commission measures the area 
which injection will be reduced by the radius around the area where 
earthquake activity has been located.
105
  
To more fully understand the issue posed by relying on the radius from a 
point at which an earthquake emanates, some background information on 
how injection wells work and are regulated is instructive. It is first worth 
mentioning that focusing on injection wells is appropriate because the 
OCC’s preliminary evidence indicates that seismicity linked to deep 
injection—as opposed to well completion—is “more numerous and often 
[involves] far larger quakes.”
106
 As for the wells themselves, an “injection 
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well” for purposes of this note will refer to several things. First, this note 
focuses primarily on the OCC’s regulation of injection wells described in 
Title 52, section 139(B)(1) of the Oklahoma Statutes. Commonly, these 
injection wells are known as “Class II Wells.”
107
 A Class II Well is simply 
an injection well
108
 that is related to Oil and Gas, but Class II wells are 
divided into three main types: (1) disposal wells, (2) enhanced recovery 
wells, and (3) hydrocarbon storage wells.
109
 First, disposal wells reinject 
brines that previously brought to the surface during normal oil and gas 
extraction.
110
 Also included in the disposal well category are those that 
involve wastewater injections associated with hydraulic fracturing.
111
 
Second, enhanced recovery wells are those wells that inject fluids into 
formations to recover oil.
112
 Third, hydrocarbon storage wells, as the name 
might indicate, store liquid hydrocarbons in underground formations.
113
  
Although there are several different “types” of injection wells, the 
Commission’s regulations and directives regarding these wells in its effort 
to combat earthquakes appear unified by one thing—the radius from a point 
which earthquakes linked to injection well operations originate. Because 
Murr offers a new approach and a new balancing test to our understanding 
of “property” and relevant parcels in terms of the Takings Clause, several 
questions remain unanswered when considering the OCC’s regulatory 
approach to injection wells as preventative measures against earthquake 
activity. For example, is the use of the radius from an earthquake’s location 
a “reasonable expectation[] [that] an acquirer of land must acknowledge” in 
terms of expecting “legitimate restrictions affecting his or her subsequent 
use and dispensation of the property” when selecting a site for an injection 
well?
114
 Moreover, do the other two Murr factors “fit” squarely with the 
OCC’s “radius approach” to regulating injection wells? The fact that the 
“radius approach” fails to specifically address parcels owned by more than 
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one landowner complicates this question. It is doubtful that the Court in 
Murr contemplated these questions, so future litigation regarding this issue 
is quite unpredictable. 
B. Application of Murr’s Parcel-as-a-whole Concept 
The newly adopted, federal approach to the parcel-as-a-whole concept 
presents a unique problem in the injection well context. To demonstrate the 
problem, suppose the following: An individual owns a rather large piece of 
land in Oklahoma that consists of more than one contiguous parcel, and the 
landowner uses it for different purposes. In this case, if the OCC 
implements a regulation prohibiting the use of injection wells on part of the 
parcel, and the landowner described has an injection well on only one small 
portion of one of the parcels due to the topography, usage, or some other 
limitation of the land, the landowner could be effectively prohibited from 
placing injection wells on all of her property. A scenario like this is 
arguably already within the Court’s contemplations in Murr, but the fact 
that the Murrs did not prevail would give the above described landowner 
cause for concern that an OCC regulation may completely bar her from 
using injection wells on her parcels.
115
  
Consider another example: A landowner has a small business operation 
which happens to have one injection well on the property. If the injection 
well is the only thing keeping the business operation viable and the OCC 
prohibits injection wells in that location, the business owner cannot say 
with any certainty that they are protected by Murr. Murr is, instead, 
concerned with the change in the overall value of the property, not whether 
someone’s business fails because of regulation. Alternatively, suppose the 
worst. Even entertaining the idea of a situation where the OCC prohibits 
injection wells and all other oil and gas operations on all a landowner’s 
property, the consequence of Murr is that the inevitable decrease in 
property value will be valued against the entire property’s value. This 
calculation does not appear to change even though the landowner’s mineral 
rights have been all but taken away. Admittedly, these would extreme and 
rare examples, but they demonstrate how flexible Murr allows a court’s 
judgment to be in terms of whether a taking has occurred. 
Another consequence of adopting the parcel-as-a-whole concept is that it 
appears to place a new burden of expectation on landowners. The question 
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that arises here is this: When the Court says in Murr that the “reasonable 
expectations of an acquirer of land [regarding] restrictions affecting his or 
her subsequent use”
116
 of that land must be considered when determining 
the parcel relevant for takings analysis, what is a “reasonable expectation?” 
Further, is it really appropriate for a federal court—rather than a state 
legislature—to tell landowners what they should reasonably expect to 
encounter as a landowner? 
Given the media coverage of earthquakes, fracking, and injection wells 
in Oklahoma, must a landowner now reasonably expect that their land will 
be regulated by the OCC for that purpose? If so, does such an expectation 
change the way OCC would value property in its compensation calculation? 
All these questions are unanswered by the court in Murr, thus leaving 
landowners and regulators with an uncertain future. 
Notably, these complications are unlikely to be resolved in favor of 
landowners. Analogously, even before Murr, oil and gas operators engaging 
in hydraulic fracturing were unlikely to prevail in takings cases when 
regulators did not place complete bans on the practice.
117
 Importantly, it 
does not appear that placing a total ban on injection well operations is a 
strategy the OCC has taken yet. This, combined with Oklahoma federal 
courts’ deference to the OCC on regulatory matters, signals a challenge for 
Oklahoma landowners in the wake of Murr. Further still, the fact that the 
Supreme Court has now adopted the parcel-as-a-whole concept clouds any 
predictive analysis previously available to landowners thinking about suing 
the OCC. 
VIII. Conclusion 
To the extent that the Supreme Court adhered to fundamental principles 
underlying earlier Takings Clause cases, the Court correctly decided Murr. 
However, adding another multi-factor test to the equation while 
functionally adopting the parcel-as-a-whole concept as a matter of federal 
constitutional law will add complications for Oklahoma landowners. 
Whether the OCC will use Murr as a tool to regulate away injection wells 
to combat seismic activity is yet to be seen. Ultimately, if the OCC does 
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increase such regulations, landowners who choose to bring a regulatory 
takings case to federal court in Oklahoma face an uphill battle. 
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